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Research shows that political elites tend to favour their home region when
distributing resources. But what explains how political power is distributed
across a country’s regions to begin with? Joan Ricart-Huguet draws on recent
research to show that colonial-era education underpins the distribution of
political power in post-colonial Africa.
Ministerial appointments are highly coveted government positions among the political
elite in Africa and elsewhere. This is for good reason. Cabinet ministers enjoy some
amount of discretion over the allocation of resources, especially in countries with weak
institutions and weak legislatures. This turns a cabinet post into a very valuable means
to satisfy one’s constituents. A wealth of research shows that political elites
disproportionately favour their home region, especially in less democratic countries. As
Robert Bates once wrote, ‘in the political arena, it is not just power that is at stake, but
also the bene t which power can bring.’
Perhaps because of how much is at stake, the formation and composition of
government cabinets is always conceived as a short-term and highly strategic affair, in
Africa and globally. Some scholars argue that cabinet formation is the result of so-called
‘regional favouritism’, whereby the president/prime minister favours his or her own
region or ethnic group through patronage in the provision of public services and goods
and even ministerial appointments. They have a point. Just consider the many
presidents who engaged in such patronage: Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire favoured
the Baoulé during his 33-year rule; Museveni in Uganda has favoured Western Ugandans
since he rose to power in 1986, and so on. Other scholars argue instead that, especially
since the African democratisation wave of the 1990s, ‘regional balancing’ is preeminent
–  the idea that ‘representation in a president’s cabinet has to appear to be equitable’ to
avoid con ict. They also have a point.
However, in a recently published article, I show that these two short-term explanations
are incomplete. I made the realisation after coding the birthplace of most of the roughly
5,000 ministers in cabinets in 16 countries – the 16 former British and French colonies
in East and West Africa (Figure 1). The map, while perhaps interesting visually and to
show the extent to which districts are represented in the cabinet in the post-colonial
period, is only a snapshot.
Figure 1. Birth locations of ministers in East and West Africa (1960–2010 average).
Credit: Joan Ricart-Huguet.
Figure 2 is more helpful. It shows the percentage of ‘minister-years’ (most ministers stay
in power for more than one year) by district in Uganda and Senegal between 1960 and
2010. If regional balancing produced equitable distributions of minister-year shares,
then the distribution would be uniform (the left graphs would be  at) or proportional to
population (the right graphs would be  at). Neither is the case. Some districts have
systematically punched above their weight since independence and others below.
For example, Western Ugandan districts such as Ankole and Kigezi have punched above
their weight and, in Senegal, 14% of the minister-years were born in Saint Louis even
though the district comprises less than 2% of Senegal’s population. Western districts in
Uganda are over-represented partly because President Museveni (1986–) was born
there, but regional favouritism alone cannot explain the patterns in Figure 2 either. In
Uganda, other districts outside the Western region are over-represented, and, in any
case, patronage-type explanations beg the question of why leaders such as Museveni
hail from one district or another in the  rst place. Regional favouritism cannot explain
the case of Saint Louis either: no Senegalese president was born there. In spite of post-
colonial political instability in many East and West African countries, district
representation in the 1960s positively correlates with district representation in the 2000s
(ρ = 0.46). This clearly points to persistent inequalities in political representation that
neither theory can explain. What does underpin these patterns of political
representation?
Figure 2. Minister-shares by colonial district of birth (1960–2010 average). Credit: Joan
Ricart-Huguet.
I offer a deeper historical explanation rooted in the colonial period. Indeed, a vibrant
research agenda exists on the consequences of colonialism for economic development,
but I leverage the colonisation of East and West Africa to examine instead how
colonialism in uenced political development, and speci cally the distribution of political
power since independence. I show that colonial-era investments in education – but not
in infrastructure, health or other development proxies – increase district representation
(the minister shares of Figure 2) in postcolonial governments. The political effect of
education, proxied by the number of teachers and missionaries per district, is larger in
the 1960-1990 period but persists even after 1990 in spite of regime changes and
instability during the Cold War. The effect is also very visible in civilian governments, the
majority, but largely null in military governments. Why?
Figure 3. Effect of education on district minister-shares by decade and type of
government. Credit: Joan Ricart-Huguet.
I argue that post-colonial ministers are in part a byproduct of education-based
recruitment into the colonial state. Europeans administered East and West African
colonial states ‘on the cheap’, so they recruited educated Africans instead of Europeans
as civil servants to reduce costs (whereas individuals from districts with little to no
education provision ended up in the military). As a result, districts with more primary
education provided a larger pool of potential candidates to join the civil service and
colonial-era legislative councils (assemblées territoriales in French colonies).
Europeans had little concern for regional balancing until the 1950s. Regional political
inequality was the unintended long-term consequence of this selection criterion whereby
education – or more often lack thereof – conditioned the pool of potential ministers
from a region (in extreme cases, such as Uganda’s Karamoja region, there were no
secondary schools at independence in 1962). Literacy and numeracy learned in school
were transferable to the civil service. In turn, organisational skills acquired in the civil
service and in colonial legislatures provided some with an early advantage in post-
colonial politics. For example, Saint Louis had ceded much of its early importance to
Dakar, the economic and political capital, by 1900. However, Saint Louis remained an
important centre of primary and secondary education and that helps explain its over-
representation after 1960.
Remaining questions
If (unequal) colonial education is important to explain (unequal) political representation
since 1960, then what explains why education was scarcer in some colonial districts
than others? I tackle this question in a related article, summarised for the African
Economic History Network (AEHN) blog. I show that coastal areas with natural harbours
and capes (such as Mombasa, Dakar) were much more likely to become centres of pre-
colonial trade in East and West Africa. Those pre-colonial trading posts, and districts
near them, concentrated the bulk of government and missionary education during the
colonial period. These are the deep roots of East and West Africa’s unequal economic
development and unequal political representation.
Ricart-Huguet J. (2021). Colonial Education, Political Elites, and Regional Political
Inequality in Africa. Comparative Political Studies: read here.
Ricart-Huguet, J. (2021). The Origins of Colonial Investments in Former British and
French Africa. British Journal of Political Science: read here.
Photo by Jordan Rowland on Unsplash.
About the author
Posted In: Education | Politics
Leave a Reply 
Enter your comment here...
Joan Ricart-Huguet (@ricarthuguet) is Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Loyola University Maryland. He received his PhD from Princeton in 2018 and an
M.A. in Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences from Columbia University. His
interests are wide-ranging and include political elites, education, colonial legacies
and culture. You can  nd out more on his website: www.ricarthuguet.com.
Joan Ricart-Huguet
